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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CRUISING FOR A BRUISING-AN

ATTACK

ON THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL

Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania (1990)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that there is
a constitutionally protected fundamental right to interstate travel,' but
has never decided whether this right extends to intrastate travel or "localized intrastate movement." 2 The Third Circuit recently addressed
this question in Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania,3 when residents of the

City of York, Pennsylvania challenged a city ordinance which prohibited
vehicular "cruising" on particular city streets. 4 The plaintiffs in Lutz argued that such an ordinance violated their constitutionally protected
right to travel. 5 The city contended, however, that the right to travel did
not extend to purely intrastate travel such as the cruising proscribed by
6
the ordinance.
1. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-69 (1974)
(applying strict scrutiny to residency requirement statute which infringed upon
fundamental right of interstate travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360
(1972) (durational residency requirements as prerequisite to voting eligibility
held unconstitutional under equal protection clause as infringement upon
voter's right of interstate travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (statutes affecting fundamental right to interstate travel reviewed by strict
standard); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another ...occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union."). For a discussion of the Court's decisions
asserting a fundamental right to interstate travel, see infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
2. See Gray, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1329, 1352

(1986) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never explicitly extended the right to travel
to movement entirely within a state."); McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper
Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 324 (1985)

("[T]he Supreme Court has never addressed whether this liberty interest [the
right to travel] encompasses intrastate travel ....
");Developments, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees-Overview, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1751 n.70
(1984) ("Although the right to interstate travel is fundamental, the [Supreme]
Court has not settled the question whether the right to intrastate travel is fundamental ....").
3. 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 256. The plaintiff challenged York, Pa., Ordinance No. 6, § 3(a)
(Apr. 19, 1988). Id. at 257. For a further discussion of the particular elements
of the York anticruising statute and the legislative findings which lead to its enactment, see infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
5. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256. Lutz also raised an overbreadth claim. Id. For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of the overbreadth claim, see infra
note 30 and accompanying text.
6. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256.

(997)
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The Third Circuit analyzed the language of the Constitution and
concluded that a constitutional right to intrastate travel does indeed exist. 7 The court considered the following seven possible constitutional
sources of the asserted right to intrastate travel: the privileges and immunities clause contained in article IV,8 the privileges or immunities
clause contained in the fourteenth amendment, 9 a conception of national citizenship,' 0 the commerce clause," the equal protection
clause, 12 and the due process clauses of both the fifth' 3 and fourteenth
amendments.1 4 The court found that a right to intrastate travel is both
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' 5 and "deeply rooted in the
Nation's history,"' 6 and thus concluded that a right to intrastate travel is
founded upon substantive due process grounds.17
7. Id. at 258-68. The source of the right to travel, either intrastate or interstate, has never before been firmly established. See Comment, The Right to Travel
In Search of a ConstitutionalSource, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117 (1975); Comment, A Strict
Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1975).
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause of
article IV states, "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id. For a discussion of the article
IV privileges and immunities clause as a potential source of the right to travel,
see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The privileges or immunities clause contained in the fourteenth amendment states, "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ...... Id. For a discussion of the fourteenth amendment privileges or
immunities clause as a potential source of the right to travel, see infra notes 6569 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the theory of a "national citizenship" as a potential
source of the right to travel, see infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The commerce clause of article I states, "The
Congress shall have Power... To regulate commerce ... among the several

States .... Id. For a discussion of the commerce clause as a potential source of
the right to travel, see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states, "No State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. For a discussion of the equal
protection clause as a potential source of the right to travel, see infra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment
states, "No person shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... Id. For a further discussion of the fifth amendment due
process clause as a potential source of the right to travel, see infra notes 80-90
and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment states, "No State shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Id. For a discussion of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as a potential source of the right to
travel, see infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
15. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
16. Id. at 267 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
17. Id. at 268. The phrases quoted above from Palko and Moore are usually
articulated as the test for determining whether a right is to be recognized as
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After recognizing a fundamental right to intrastate travel, the court
used a first amendment analysis and scrutinized the ordinance as a time,
place and manner regulation. 18 The court held that the anticruising ordinance was narrowly tailored to combat the safety and congestion
problems asserted by the city and therefore constituted a reasonable
time, place and manner restriction on localized intrastate travel.' 9
II.

FACTS

In 1988, the City of York, Pennsylvania enacted an "anticruising"
ordinance, which prohibited "cruising" or "unnecessary repetitive driving" within certain designated areas of the city.2 0 Specifically, the law
barred the driving of vehicles past a clearly designated "traffic control
point[]" in downtown York more than twice within any two hour period
between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. 2 1 Those convicted of vio22
lating the ordinance were fined fifty dollars.
The York city council had enacted the ordinance based upon its determination that, on certain evenings, cruising congested the streets
along main thoroughfares in the downtown area, resulting in a serious
threat to the public health, safety and welfare. 23 At trial, testimony by
fundamental under a substantive due process analysis. Id. at 267. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's use of these phrases as the test in its finding of a
constitutional right to intrastate travel, see infra notes 82-90 and accompanying

text.
18. Id. at 269-70. For a further discussion of the unique standard of review
employed by the Third Circuit, see infra notes 91-101 & 126-30 and accompanying text.
19. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 270. For a further discussion of the application by the
Third Circuit of the time, place and manner analysis to the York statute see, infra
notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
20. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256-57. The ordinance defined "cruising" as:
[D]riving a motor vehicle on a street past a traffic control point, as designated by the York City Police Department, more than twice in any two
(2) hour period, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. The
passing of a designated control point a third time under the aforesaid
conditions shall constitute unnecessary repetitive driving and therefore
a violation of this Ordinance.
Id. at 257 (quoting York, Pa., Ordinance No. 6, § 3(a) (Apr. 19, 1988)).
21. Id. The York City Police designated clearly identifiable points of reference along particular blocks of both Philadelphia and Market streets. Id. These
two streets, the main thoroughfares in downtown York, were an integral part of
the 22 block loop "frequented by the cruisers." Id. at 257 n.2.
22. Id. at 257. When a violation occurred, only the vehicle owner, if present, was charged with the cruising violation. Id. If the owner was not present,
then the driver of the car at the time of the infraction was assessed the violation.
Id. In addition, the ordinance excluded both municipal and commercial vehicles. Id.
23. Id. The City Council of York concluded:
It is hereby found that with consistency, on certain days and times,
a threat to the public health, safety and welfare arises from the congestion created by repetitive unnecessary driving of motor vehicles on
main thoroughfares within the City of York. The purpose of this Ordi-
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several York city officials supported the legislative finding and defended
the ordinance. Thomas Gross, a York police officer assigned to traffic
safety, testified that traffic congestion within the city was worse during
times of cruising than during rush hour periods. 24 Keith Ressler, the
night shift supervisor of the York police department, testified that emergency vehicles were unable to respond quickly to calls for assistance during hours when cruising was ongoing.2 5 Finally, the testimony of
George Kroll, the York fire chief and ambulance administrator, indicated that two of York's fire stations were within the restricted cruising
area and the congestion in front of such fire houses during cruising
hours would at times hinder or make impossible a necessary quick and
26
orderly exit from the station.
The plaintiff, David Lutz, sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
the enforcement of the ordinance by York's police force, claiming that
its provisions both abridged his right to travel and were unnecessarily
overbroad. 27 After a hearing, the district court noted that the freedom
to cruise was an ordinary liberty interest and the anticruising ordinance
could therefore be upheld if it was "rationally related to a legitimate
governmental, objective." 2 8s Accordingly, the district court denied the
plaintiff's request for the preliminary injunction, explaining that Lutz
'29
was "unlikely to prevail on the merits of his right to travel claim."
nance is to reduce the dangerous traffic congestion, as well as the excessive noise and pollution resulting from such unnecessary repetitive
driving, and to insure sufficient access for emergency vehicles to and
through the designated city thoroughfares now hampered by this repetitive driving of motor vehicles.
Id. (quoting York, Pa., Ordinance No. 6, § 2 (Apr. 19, 1988)).
24. Id. Specifically, Gross recited a study undertaken in November 1983,

which measured the number of cars passing a particular point per unit of time.
Id. at 257. The study indicated that traffic on a Friday night from 9-11 p.m. was
almost as high as during rush hour. Id. Gross also testified, based on his "personal observation" of traffic flow in the area in question, that traffic was worse
during cruising hours than during rush hour; during rush hour, "traffic was
'heavy, but flowed smoothly,' " but during cruising hours, traffic was "often at
'virtually a complete standstill'...." Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 37, 39).
25. Id. Ressler's testimony revealed that "it could take as long as 20 minutes to travel two blocks in the affected areas." Id. Ressler noted that traffic
during cruising hours will sometimes not move at all because people in one car
will stop, even at green lights, to talk to the occupants in another car. Id. (citing
Brief for Appellee at 50-52).

26. Id. at 258. Kroll testified that traffic in front of the central firehouse,
which was located on Market Street, was often at a "standstill" during cruising
hours. Id. He noted that such continual obstacles could make it "impossible for
the fire engines to exit the station" and that " 'seconds, not even minutes' can be
critical in controlling fires and saving lives." Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at
56-58).
27. Id.

28. Id. (quoting Lutz v. City of York, 692 F. Supp. 457, 459-61 (M.D. Pa.
1988)). The district court reasoned that the right to cruise only rose to the level
of a liberty interest and was not a fundamental constitutional right. Id.
29. Id. (citing Lutz, 692 F. Supp. at 459-61).
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Additionally, the district court rejected the plaintiff's overbreadth contention because the ordinance did not potentially hamper any first
30
amendment rights.
Lutz then amended his original complaint to include a second plaintiff and again sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City of York
from enforcing the anticruising ordinance. 3 ' The district court applied
the same rationale employed in Lutz's first challenge to the ordinance
and dismissed the action outright.3 2 Lutz appealed the dismissal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Third Circuit began its analysis of Lutz's challenge to the York
ordinance by assessing whether the regulation of local travel, such as
cruising, implicates a protected right.33 First, the Third Circuit traced
the jurisprudence of the right to interstate travel as developed by the
United States Supreme Court.3 4 Specifically, the court recounted the
facts and rationale of the principal Supreme Court decisions addressing
interstate travel to provide a framework for its later analysis of the potential sources for the unenumerated right to intrastate travel. 3 5
The Third Circuit began by citing United States v. Guest,3 6 in which
the Supreme Court recognized that the right to interstate travel is a fundamental right.3 7 The court then noted that three years after Guest, the
30. Id. (citing Lutz, 692 F. Supp. at 461). The Third Circuit stated that
overbreadth claims "[are] allowed in the First Amendment context only because
of 'the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression,'
and [have] never been recognized outside the First Amendment context." Id. at
271 (citations omitted). Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the overbreadth claim outright because no first amendment issue was raised on appeal.
Id. at 270-71. Ironically, although the court refused to hear the first amendment
challenge on appeal, it applied a standard of review which had previously been
limited to only the first amendment context. Because of the outright dismissal

of this claim in Lutz and the fact that the overbreadth claim has been traditionally
limited to the first amendment area by the Supreme Court, this author will not

further address the issue.
31. Id. at 258. Lutz's rationale for adding the second plaintiff, Weber, was
neither explained nor addressed by the Third Circuit. Id.
32. Id. The district court dismissed the action after a hearing on the preliminary injunction "at which no issues of material fact were contested." Id. at
258 n.5. For a discussion of the district court's rationale used in the original
denial of plaintiff's claim, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.

33. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258.
34. Id. at 258-62. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the
jurisprudence of the right to interstate travel, see infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.

35. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258-62. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's search
for a constitutional source for the right to travel, see infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
36. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
37. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966)). In Guest, the Court stated, "[tihe constitutional right to travel from one
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Court decided Shapiro v. Thompson,3 8 the leading modem interstate
travel case. The Court struck down a durational residency requirement
as an invalid statutory prerequisite to obtaining welfare benefits 3 9 reasoning that the states' residency requirement penalized the exercise of a
person's fundamental right to interstate travel, and was thus unconstitutional in the absence of a compelling state interstate. 40 Following its
consideration of Shapiro, the Third Circuit noted that, since Shapiro, the
Court has repeatedly recognized the existence of a fundamental right to
interstate travel. 4 ' Moreover, most of the United States Supreme Court
cases involving interstate travel since Shapiro have involved similar impermissible residency requirements.
For example, the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein 4 2 relied upon the reasoning of Shapiro to strike down a durational residency requirement
which served as a pre-condition of voter eligibility. 4 3 A similar resiState to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities
of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized." Guest, 383 U.S. at 757.
In Guest, appellees were six individuals who had been indicted under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 for depriving African-Americans of their rights, including the right to interstate travel. Id. at 746-47 n.l. Because the issue in this case
fell under a federal statute, the Court did not have to consider a constitutional
source for the asserted right to interstate travel. Id. at 759.

38. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
39. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 258. In Shapiro, the various statutes in question denied
welfare assistance to residents of Pennsylvania, Connecticut and the District of

Columbia who had not been residents of "their jurisdiction[] for at least one
year immediately preceding their applications for assistance." 394 U.S. at 622.
The Court invalidated the statutes under the equal protection clause, concluding that the statutes treated new residents differently from long-time residents
based on their having exercised their constitutionally protected right to interstate travel. Id. at 638.
40. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. The Court stated that, "moving from State to
State ...appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634
(citations omitted).
In Shapiro, the main contention of the state governments was that the waiting periods were justified as a way for those states to "preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs." Id. at 627. The Supreme Court held
that the waiting periods created a classification of citizens within the state and
thus were in violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 638.
41. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 259.
42. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
43. Id. at 360. In Dunn, a Tennessee voting registration law allowed individual registration only for those residents who were residents of the state for a
year and residents of their respective county for three months prior to the election. Id. at 331. Because the requirement infringed on a fundamental right to
interstate travel, the Court employed strict scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of the registration law. Id. at 338-39. The Court held that, "[t]he right to
travel is an 'unconditional personal right,' a right whose exercise may not be conditioned." Id. at 341 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring));
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 292 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring and dis-
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dency requirement limiting an individual's right to receive free nonemergency medical treatment was also struck down in Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County,44 wherein the Court again implemented the Shapiro
rationale. 4 5 The Third Circuit recognized, however, that the Supreme
Court upheld a durational residency requirement in Sosna v. Iowa.4 6 The
Court concluded that the requirement that parties filing for a divorce
within the state must be genuinely attached to the state was an interest
47
which reasonably justified a residency requirement.
Finally, the Third Circuit considered two more recent decisions of
the Court which struck down similar durational residency requirement
48
statutes, but used somewhat different reasoning. In Zobel v. Williams,
the Court struck down an Alaska statute which distributed funds to adult
residents based upon their length of residence in the state.4 9 The Court
found that the statute could not even pass a minimum rationality test,
and therefore a higher level of judicial scrutiny did not have to be consenting)). For a discussion of the reasoning of Shapiro, see supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
44. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
45. Id. at 261-62, 269. In Maricopa, the appellant, who was an indigent,
moved from New Mexico to Arizona. Id. at 251. Several days later, he suffered a
respiratory attack and went to a private hospital, which, after initial treatment,
sought to transfer him to a county hospital. Id. Under Arizona law, individual
county governments were responsible for the care of the indigent sick, but a
state law required that the indigent must have been a resident of the county for
12 months prior to receiving non-emergency treatment. Id. at 252. The county
hospital refused to admit the appellant, because he had not met such a residency
requirement. Id. The Court determined that because the right to travel is fundamental and that the "invidious discrimination" created by the statute impinges upon that right, strict scrutiny should be applied in assessing the
constitutionality of the Arizona law. Id. at 261-62. The Court held that the state
had not demonstrated a compelling state interest to justify the statute, and
therefore, the statute was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
.Id. at 269.
46. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
47. Id. at 406-10. In Sosna, Iowa had imposed a one year residency requirement on couples attempting to obtain a divorce within the state. Id. at 395. The
Court upheld the statute on the grounds that the state's dual interests in (1) requiring residents to have some attachment to the state and (2) insulating its own
divorce decrees from collateral attack, were reasonably justified. Id. at 409.
The Third Circuit noted in Lutz that, although the Sosna Court appeared
unwilling to impose strict judicial scrutiny, the proposition that durational residency requirements receive heightened scrutiny remained intact. Lutz, 899 F.2d
at 259 n.6.
48. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
49. Id. at 65. Because of the discovery of large oil reserves on parts of
state-owned land in Alaska, the state had a substantial budgetary windfall, which
it wished to distribute to its residents. Id. at 56-57. Under the state enacted
distribution plan, each adult citizen of Alaska would receive one "dividend unit"
for each year of residency after 1959, the first year of Alaska's statehood. Id. at
57. In 1979, the first year of the dividend payment, a "dividend unit" was set by
the state at $50. Id. Appellants were two year residents who challenged the
distribution plan. Id.
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sidered. 50 In Attorney General of N. Y v. Soto-Lopez, 5 1Justice Brennan reasserted the heightened scrutiny test, first articulated in Shapiro, to strike
down a New York statute which gave preference in obtaining civil service employment to veterans who were residents of the state prior to
entering the service.52 Justice Brennan's opinion, however, could only
garner a plurality, as two concurring Justices applied a rational basis
53
test-similar to Zobel-to strike down the statute.
Although the Third Circuit recognized the plethora of prior United
States Supreme Court cases addressing the putative right to travel, it
concluded that, because such prior decisions exclusively involved durational residency requirements which had only discriminated against interstate immigrants, the Court had not directly addressed the question
of whether there exists a fundamental right to intrastate travel. 54 Moreover, the Lutz court posited that because these prior cases were all fairly
similar in that they all involved a durational residency requirement, the
Supreme Court had dispensed with a step-by-step analysis of the constitutional basis of the right to travel. 5 5 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that the Supreme Court's interstate travel jurisprudence offered
50. Id. at 60-61. In subjecting the statute to review under the equal protection clause, the Court held that the asserted State interests of (1) establishing a
financial incentive for residents to remain in Alaska and (2) assuring "prudent
management" of the Fund and of the state's natural resources, are not rationally
related to the classifications created by the statute. Id. at 61.
51. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
52. Id. at 911. Preference for civil service employment was given, in the
form of additional points for ranking purposes, to applicants who were veterans
of the United States Armed Forces, who served during time of war, and who
were New York residents prior to entering the Service. Id. at 900. Appellees,
veterans who had served during time of war, but who were not residents of New
York prior to entering the Service, challenged the statutory preference. Id. at
900-01. The Court analyzed the statute under the equal protection clause as it
has typically done where a statute creates different classes of residents. Id. at
904. The state's asserted interests included encouraging residents to enter the
service, rewarding residents for war-time service, encouraging residents to return to the state and taking advantage of the unique skills gained by residents
who have served in war. Id. at 909. The Court held that these interests did not
rise to the level of compelling as required under an equal protection analysis.
Id. at 911.
53. Id. at 912-16. In Soto-Lopez, Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of
the Court, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined, applied a
strict scrutiny test. Id. at 904. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, but applied only a rational basis test. Id. at 912-13. Similarly,
Justice White concurred in the judgment, agreeing with Chief Justice Burger's
conclusion that the classifications contained in the New York statute at issue in
the case were irrational and therefore unconstitutional, but finding that "the
right to travel [was] not sufficiently implicated . . . to require heightened scru-

tiny." Id. at 916.
54. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 259-60. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to address the intrastate travel issue, see articles cited supra note 2. For a
discussion of Third Circuit decisions which have addressed the issue, see infra
notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
55. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 260. The Lutz court stated that the Supreme Court
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little guidance in assessing the constitutionality of a city ordinance which
burdened intrastate travel.
After establishing that the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed the issue, the Third Circuit looked to the decisions of other
courts of appeals to determine whether other circuits had considered
whether a right to intrastate travel exists. The court concluded that only
the Second Circuit had addressed the issue when it held in King v. New
Rochelle Municipal HousingAuthority 56 that the fundamental right to travel
did indeed encompass intrastate travel. 57 In King, the Second Circuit
concluded that "[I]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel
between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to
58
acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state."
Although the Third Circuit in Lutz agreed with the final result of the
King decision, it found its reasoning to be inadequate. 59 Finding little
guidance from either the other circuits nor the Supreme Court, the
Third Circuit finally considered whether the language of the Constitution supported the existence of the asserted fundamental constitutional
right to intrastate travel.
The Third Circuit first examined the privileges and immunities
61
clause of article IV. 60 The Third Circuit relied on Paul v. Virginia,
"has dispensed with analysis of the appropriate textual basis in the Constitution
for the unenumerated right to travel." Id.
56. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
57. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261. The Third Circuit stated, "[King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority is] the only court of appeals case we know to have
decided the question" of whether the right to travel encompasses the right to
intrastate travel. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Third Circuit was incorrect in concluding that King was the only court of appeals case addressing the
issue of intrastate travel. For a discussion of other court of appeals cases addressing the right to intrastate travel, see infra notes 119-25 accompanying text.
58. King, 442 F.2d at 648. In King, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of a five year durational residency requirement for admission to public housing
which was imposed by the New Rochelle Housing Authority. Id. at 646-47.
Plaintiff's claim was based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 647. The residency requirement treated long-term residents
*differently than short-term residents. Id. at 648. The court found that longterm residents had no greater need and would not benefit any more from public
housing than short-term residents. Id. at 649. In striking down the residency
requirement, the Second Circuit held that, because the residency requirement
violated plaintiff's fundamental right to travel, including intrastate travel, the
resolution could only be upheld "if it furthers a compelling state interest." Id. at
648. The residency requirement did not meet this standard. Id.
59. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261. As part of its reasoning for finding the King rationale inadequate, the Lutz court stated, "[To the extent that the right to travel
grows out of constitutional text animated by structural concerns of federalism
...it might be entirely 'meaningful' to suppose that the right is not implicated
by reasonable restrictions on localized intrastate movement." Id. at 261-62.
60. Id. at 262. For the text of the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV, see supra note 8.
61. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
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where the Supreme Court held that the clause was not the source of any
unenumerated fundamental right, but was simply a "federalism-based
anti-discrimination principle."'6 2 Since Paul, courts have uniformly
agreed that the privileges and immunities clause of article IV is essentially aimed at "insur[ing] to a citizen of State A who ventures into State
B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy."' 6 3 Because

the cruising statute in Lutz applied evenhandedly to both in-state and
out-of-state residents, the Third Circuit found that it did not implicate
the article IV clause. 64
Similarly, the Third Circuit considered the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment as a possible source of a right
to intrastate travel. 65 The Lutz court noted that the Supreme Court in
the Slaughter-House Cases6 6 held that only those rights which "owe their
existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws," were protected. 6 7 Thus, after Slaughter-House
stripped the privileges and immunities clause of providing any
unenumerated rights, the Court pointed exclusively to the due process
clause as a basis for the unenumerated rights contained within the Constitution. 68 In light of Slaughter-House, the Lutz court concluded that the
"[p]laintiffs therefore cannot rely on the Fourteenth Amendment Privi62. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262 (citing Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168). The Paul
Court stated, "It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place
the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so
far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned
...." Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180.
In Paul, .the legislature of the state of Virginia passed a law that required any
insurance company not incorporated in the state of Virginia to first obtain a
license to sell insurance and to deposit a substantial bond with the treasurer of
the State. Id. at 168-69. Defendant Paul, a resident of Virginia, was convicted of
violating this law. Id. at 169. In affirming the conviction, the Court found that
the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause was to protect citizens of
one state, while they are present in another state. Id. at 180. Because Paul was a
citizen of Virginia, where the law in question was enacted, the privileges and
immunities clause would not protect him. Id.
63. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 262 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395

(1948)).
64. Id. at 263.
65. Id. at 263-64. For the text of the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, see supra note 9.

66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
67. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 263 (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79).
In the Slaughter-HouseCases, the State of Louisiana passed a law which granted a
monopoly to a particular company to operate slaughterhouses in the New Orle-

ans area. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 59. Independent butchers challenged the
statute under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment
as interfering with their ability to practice their trade. Id. at 60. The Court held
that the privileges and immunities clause served to protect citizens of the United
States from infringements upon their right of national, not state, citizenship. Id.
at 74-75.
68. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 264. Indeed, the right to intrastate travel, if it exists as
such, is such an unenumerated right.
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leges and Immunities Clause" as the source of a fundamental right to
69
intrastate travel.
The Third Circuit next considered a theory of national citizenship
as a possible basis for the right to intrastate travel. Specifically, it recognized that in Crandall v. Nevada, 70 the Supreme Court held that the right
to travel was protected as an incidence of national citizenship "insofar as
travel is necessary for the transaction of business between the national
government and its citizenry." 7 1 The Third Circuit reasoned, however,
that the cruising ordinance did not infringe or hamper a citizen's access
to any federal institution, and thus, the rights recognized in Crandall
were not affected by the York ordinance. 7 2 Consequently, a right of intrastate travel could not be derived from the concept of national
73
citizenship.
In analyzing York's ordinance under the commerce clause,74 the
Third Circuit recognized that a statute which infringes upon the importation of goods is per se unconstitutional, but concluded that York's ordinance "imposes no threat of burdening the stream of commerce
.... -75 The court further explained that the safety benefits of the stat-

ute were significant, while the burden upon interstate commerce was
76
negligible.
69. Id. The Third Circuit observed that the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment has "remained essentially moribund since
Slaughter-House, as the source of an implied fundamental right of intrastate
travel." Id.
70. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
71. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 264 (citing Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43-44). The
Crandall Court stated that a person
has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he
may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may
have with it .... [T]his right is in its nature independent of the will of

any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.
Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44.
72. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265. The Lutz court explained that people subjected
to the York cruising ordinance are still able to "proceed unimpeded by law ...
to any federal installation at which he is called upon to exercise the various
rights and duties of citizenship." Id. According to the Lutz court's analysis, this
was essentially all that Crandall required. Id. at 264-65.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 265. For the pertinent text of the commerce clause, see supra note
11.
75. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265. Because a regulation which burdens the importation of goods was recognized by the Supreme Court as virtually per se unconstitutional under current commerce clause doctrine, the Third Circuit simply
applied the test articulated by the Supreme Court to the York ordinance. Id.
The Lutz court found that the anticruising ordinance was facially neutral as to
interstate commerce and would not burden the stream of commerce by conflicting with federal statutes and/or regulations. Id. For a discussion of test employed under a commerce clause analysis, see infra note 76.
76. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the test employed under a Commerce
Clause argument is "whether the burden that the ordinance imposes on interstate commerce 'is clearly excessive in relation to [its] putative local benefits.' "
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The Third Circuit then went on to examine the equal protection
clause for the asserted right to intrastate travel. Yet, while noting that
the equal protection clause 7 7 prohibits discrimination based upon suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, the Third Circuit opined that the
clause ordinarily creates no substantive individual rights. 78 The Third
Circuit then scrutinized the cruising ordinance and determined that the
York "ordinance ...creates no such suspect or quasi-suspect classifications," and thus the equal protection clause provides no source of pro79
tection in this case.
After dismissing all of the possible Constitutional sources of a right
to intrastate travel noted above, the Third Circuit posited that the only
potential remaining sources of a right to intrastate travel were the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 8 0 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit surveyed the modern substantive due process jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in order to determine whether such an asserted right is indeed grounded in the due process clauses of the
Constitution. 8 ' The Lutz court noted that the general test employed by
the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a right under
the due process clause could be considered fundamental was whether
such a right was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 8 2 or
Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). The Third

Circuit stated that a Commerce Clause argument in the case at bar would be
frivolous. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265.

77. Id. at 265-66. For the text of the equal protection clause, see supra note
12.
78. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 265.
79. Id. at 265-66.
80. Id. at 267. The Third Circuit noted that, "no constitutional text other
than the Due Process Clauses could possibly create a right of localized intrastate
movement, and no substantive due process case since the demise of Lochner has
considered whether the clause in fact does create such a right." Id. This statement seems to indicate that the court was employing a result-oriented analysis
whereby they had decided that the right to intrastate travel did exist, but needed
to find a source of that right to support their conclusion. After eliminating all
other possible sources, they appear to have settled on substantive due process
merely because no other alternative remained. For the text of the due process
clauses, see supra notes 13 and 14.
81. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267-68. Specifically, the Lutz court reviewed the following substantive due process cases: Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
122 (1989) (unenumerated rights are those rights "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" (quoting Justice
Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (right of persons of the same sex to engage in sexual
relations not fundamental), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (fundamental rights are those "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937) (indicating that fundamental rights are those which are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty"). For a discussion of Michael H., see infra
notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
82. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
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"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." '83 Because the
Supreme Court had recently cautioned that-such articulated phrases
cannot be read too broadly, the Third Circuit adopted a narrow view in
applying these phrases. 8 4 In employing this narrow interpretation, the
Third Circuit took note of the fact that no sitting Justice had suggested
85
that the modern doctrine of substantive due process be abandoned.
Consequently, the Third Circuit adopted the approach advocated by
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,86 which delimited a narrow concept of the fundamental rights in a substantive due
87
process claim.
In Michael H., Justice Scalia reiterated the proposition that the due
process clause did indeed include certain unenumerated rights, "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. ' '8 8 Such traditions, however, must be evaluated "at the
most specific level of generality possible." 89
83. Id.

84. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). In Bowers, the
Court noted that there should be judicial resistance to the expansion of the substantive reach of the tests delineated in Palho and Moore, so as to avoid the redefinition of those rights deemed to be fundamental. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
Otherwise, the Court explained, the judicial branch would invalidly assume the
authority "to govern the country without express Constitutional authority." Id.
The Bowers Court also stated that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id.
at 194.
85. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 267. Essentially, the Third Circuit recognized the
modern Court's limited use, but not elimination, of substantive due process
analysis.
86. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The Third Circuit viewed the modern Court as
following a narrow approach to substantive due process and adopted Justice
Scalia's view in Michael H. as the narrowest such approach. Lutz, 899 F.2d at
267-68.
87. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6. In Michael H., a California statute,
which created a presumption that a child born to a married mother while the

husband was living with the mother is the child of the husband, was challenged
by the putative father of a child born to a married couple. Id. at 113-17. Blood
tests showed with 98.07% certainty that appellant was the actual father of the
child. Id. at 114. Appellant challenged the statute as, among other things, a
violation of his substantive due process right of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in pursuing a relationship with his child. Id. at 121. The Supreme
Court held that a fundamental right under a substantive due process analysis
must "be an interest traditionally protected by our society." Id. at 122. In holding that the relationship in question was not one which our society has historically protected, the Court stated: "This is not the stuff of which fundamental
rights qualifying as liberty interests are made." Id. at 127.
88. Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
89. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268 (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6). The
Third Circuit used recent Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate this narrow
approach. Id. at 268. The Third Circuit noted that the Court has recognized a
fundamental right of marital intimacy. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965)). This right, however, cannot be expanded to a general
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Applying this narrow analysis, the Third Circuit concluded that substantive due process embodies a right to intrastate travel which is indeed, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in
the Nation's history," and therefore, the right to intrastate travel is fundamental. 90 Having concluded that a fundamental right to intrastate
travel is embodied in substantive due process, the Lutz court then sought
to establish a standard by which the judiciary could scrutinize restrictions which burden this newly recognized fundamental right.
In seeking to establish this standard of review, the Third Circuit
first noted that the York anticruising ordinance did in fact burden the
fundamental right to intrastate travel. 9 1 The court further acknowledged that once a court determines that a government action burdens a

fundamental right, a reviewing court typically applies strict scrutiny in
determining whether the government action passes constitutional muster. 92 Although offering no authority for its approach, the Lutz court
noted that not every infringement of a fundamental right, however, must
be subject to strict scrutiny. 93 Concluding that a restriction of the right
to intrastate travel need not be subjected to such scrutiny, the court instead adopted a time, place and manner methodology of analysis commonly employed when scrutinizing first amendment free speech
claims.

94

right of sexual freedom, from which might be derived a right to engage in homosexual sodomy, which the Court has held is not fundamental. Id. (citing Bowers

v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986)).
90. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268 (court quoted touchstone concepts defining fundamental rights from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) respectively). The Third
Circuit held in essence that although the right of intrastate travel is not contained in the Constitution and has not been recognized by the Supreme Court, it
is, however, part of our national tradition that one should have the right to travel
freely about. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268. Thus, under this approach, the Third Circuit concluded that there is a fundamental constitutional right to intrastate
travel. Id.
91. Id. at 268. The Third Circuit stated, "the right to travel is clearly burdened by the cruising ordinance." Id. The Third Circuit offered no reasoning
for this conclusion. Id.
92. Id. at 268-69. In Lutz, the plaintiffs argued that the routine test applied
in substantive due process cases is that a statute which burdens a fundamental
right will only "survive" if it is "no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
compelling state interests." Id. at 268. Indeed, the Lutz court acknowledged
that this is the traditional standard of review. Id. For a list of cases applying this
strict scrutiny test in the area of substantive due process, see infra note 128.
93. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The Third Circuit stated: "We believe that reviewing all infringements on the right to travel under strict scrutiny is just as
inappropriate as applying no heightened scrutiny to any infringement on the
right to travel not implicating the structural or federalism-based concerns of the
more well-established precedents." Id. The Third Circuit offered no authority
for its adoption of this approach. Id.
94. Id. The Third Circuit found that the concerns of the City of York in
adopting the cruising ordinance were analogous to the concerns underlying the
time, place and manner doctrine. Id. For a criticism of the Third Circuit's adop-
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As originally conceived, the time, place and manner doctrine allowed an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied when ana95
lyzing a regulation which imposed certain restrictions upon speech.
Under such an approach, to be upheld as constitutional, a governmental
restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate
state interest while offering adequate alternative channels of communication. 96 Thus, the Third Circuit explained that if freedom of speech, a
right expressly protected by the first amendment, could be regulated by
an intermediate standard of review, then clearly the unenumerated right
of intrastate travel could be similarly regulated under such a judicial
standard. 9 7 The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded that the anticruising statute would be valid if "narrowly tailored to meet significant city
98
objectives."
In scrutinizing the ordinance, the court first found that York's objective of ensuring the health, safety and welfare of its residents by enacting the cruising ordinance was significant. 99 Moreover, the court
concluded that the anticruising statute was narrowly tailored to further
these interests.10 0 Based on this analysis the Third Circuit upheld
York's cruising ordinance as a constitutional regulation of intrastate
travel. 101

tion of the time, place and manner test, see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
95. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-88
(1988) (applying time, place and manner analysis to test validity of ordinance

regulating picketing of residential dwellings); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177-84 (1983) (applied time, place and manner test in striking down display
statute around area surrounding Supreme Court building). See also, Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50-53 (1987).
96. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The time, place and manner test does not require
the state to use the least restrictive means available, as would be required under
a strict scrutiny level of judicial review. Id. See ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47 (1986).
97. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The court stated, "[T]he time, place and manner
doctrine allows certain restrictions on speech to survive under less than full
strict scrutiny. If the freedom of speech itself can be so qualified, then surely the
unenumerated right of localized travel can be as well." Id.
98. Id. at 270.
99. Id. The Lutz court gave no reason for arriving at this conclusion. Id.
For a discussion of the health, safety and welfare concerns asserted by the city,
see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
100. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 270. The court concluded that the York ordinance
only applied to locations within the city that were indisputably hampered by the
congestion associated with cruising. Id. In addition, the ordinance "leaves open
ample alternative routes to get about town without difficulty." Id. Another factor not stated by the court in this conclusion may have been that the ordinance
only applied during certain times of the day. See id. at 257.
101. Id. at 270.
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ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit's opinion in Lutz is noteworthy to practitioners
for several reasons. First, no other court has so clearly recognized a
fundamental right to intrastate travel.1) 2 Second, by individually considering and analyzing each asserted source, Lutz is the first decision in
which a court has attempted to clearly delineate the framework for its
03
analysis of a constitutional source upon which such a right is based.'
Most importantly, the Lutz court, in adopting a time, place and manner
standard, applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the regulation of a
fundamental right grounded in substantive due process, despite the
Supreme Court's insistence upon the application of strict scrutiny to
such fundamental rights. 10 4 Such an approach may have far-reaching
implications on other claims which challenge the infringement of substantive due process rights by the government, especially when those
rights are unenumerated.
In considering whether a fundamental right to intrastate travel exists, the Lutz court failed to properly consider two previous Third Circuit
opinions which expressly analyzed the question of intrastate travel
rights. 10 5 Most notably, in Wellford v. Battaglia,10 6 the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, which had held that, "the [constitutional] right to travel.., is
a right to intrastate as well as interstate migration."' 0 7 The district
102. Id. at 261. The court noted that there has been only one "court of
appeals case... decid[ing] the question." Id. The court explained further that
although the Second Circuit had addressed the issue of intrastate travel, the Lutz
court found "its reasoning somewhat underarticulated." Id. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to finding the constitutional source for

the right to intrastate travel, see supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of circuit court decisions finding no constitutional right of intrastate
travel, see infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
103. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261-62. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of the constitutional sources for this right, see supra notes

60-90 and accompanying text.
104. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 268-70. For a further discussion of the adoption by
the Third Circuit of the time, place and manner standard of review, see supra
notes 91-98 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
use of strict scrutiny when scrutinizing restrictions on fundamental rights under
the substantive due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment, see infra
notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
105. See Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147-48 (D. Del. 1972)
(constitutionally protected right to travel includes intrastate as well as interstate), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973); Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254-58 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (upheld curfew requirement imposed on minors, but recognized right to go where one pleases
and use public streets), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976).

106. 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973).
107. Wellford, 343 F. Supp. at 147 (citing King v. New Rochelle Municipal
Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2nd Cir. 1971)). In Wellford, the plaintiff desired to become a candidate for the mayor of Wilmington, Delaware. Id. at 144.
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court in Wellford employed strict scrutiny to strike down a Wilmington,
Delaware durational residency requirement contained within the City
Charter, which provided that any candidate for mayor must have been a
resident of the city for a minimum of five years.' 0 8 The Third Circuit in
Weliford, although reviewing the statute under an equal protection analysis, held that the right to travel Was indeed fundamental, and that the
United States Supreme Court had required that state laws limiting this
right be evaluated under a standard of strict scrutiny.' 0 9
Additionally, in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, I 10 the Third Circuit affirmed, without opinion, a decision of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which had upheld a curfew requirement imposed on minors within the town limits. I" I In Bykofsky, the district court had stated: "The rights of locomotion, freedom of
movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets... are
basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."' 1 2 However, despite
employing language which suggested that the right to travel was fundamental, the district court applied only a rational relationship test., 13 Accordingly, the court concluded "that the governmental interests
furthered by the curfew ordinance overrides the minor's constitutional
right to intrastate travel."''14.
The Department of Elections denied his request to be placed on the ballot because at the time of the election, plaintiff would have been a resident of the city
of Wilmington for only four years. Id. Thus, under the charter, plaintiff would
be incapable of holding the office of mayor. Id. Plaintiff challenged the charter
as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at

145.
108. Id. at 146. The City of Wilmington Charter, § 3-300 provided: "The
mayor shall have been a resident of the city for at least five years preceding his
election .... " Id. In striking down this durational residency requirement, the

court concluded that the objective asserted by the city, that its mayor be knowledgeable of the city's problems and resources, was not as sufficiently compelling
as required under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 145-49.
109. WeItford, 485 F.2d at 1152.
110. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
111. Bykofsky, 535 F.2d at 1245. The curfew ordinance in question prohibited any minor "under the age of eighteen from being on or remaining in or
upon the streets" during a specified period of time beginning between 10:00
p.m. and 11:00 p.m. and ending at 6:00 a.m., unless certain exceptions applied.
Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1246.
112. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1254 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 254
U.S. 281, 293 (1920)).
113. Id. at 1261-62.
114. Id. at 1261 (emphasis added). The interests asserted by the government in enacting the ordinance were: (1) the protection of the minor children;
(2) enforcement of the parent's control and responsibility for their children;
(3) public protection for mischief by minors; and (4) a reduction in the criminal
activities ofjuveniles. Id. at 1255. The district court placed emphasis on the fact
that only minors were being deprived of their rights. Id. at 1256-57. The court
noted that fundamental rights are frequently withheld from minors. Id. In this
regard, the district court stated, "The Supreme Court has recognized that the
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The district court, in applying only a rational basis test, was relying
on its understanding of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sosna." 15 However, since that time, a plurality of the Court in Soto-Lopez 116 has reaffirmed the strict scrutiny test originally delineated in Shapiro. 117 The Third Circuit, affirming the district court's determination
that a constitutional right to intrastate travel existed, 18 in essence, recognized the existence of a right to intrastate travel fifteen years prior to
the Lutz decision. The Lutz court, however, failed to even address this
prior opinion.
Not only did the Third Circuit disregard its prior decisions which
addressed the right to intrastate travel, but moreover, the Third Circuit
erred in its attempt to find other court of appeals' decisions which addressed the question of the existence of a right to intrastate travel. In
Lutz, the court remarked that the Second Circuit decision in King v. New
Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority was the only court of appeals case
which had previously decided the question of whether a right to intrastate travel existed.' 1 Actually, King was the only other court of appeals
decision to expressly recognize a fundamental right to intrastate travel;
two courts of appeals, however, have held that such a right does not exist. 1 20 The Fifth Circuit in Wright v. City ofJackson, Mississippi,12 1 explicitly held that no fundamental right to intrastate travel exists and upheld
a continual residency requirement which mandated that all municipal
employees maintain their domicile within the city limits.12 2 Similarly, in

activities and conduct of minors upon the street may be regulated and restricted
to a greater extent than those of adults." Id. at 1257.
115. Id. at 1261 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)). The district
court in Bykofsky stated: "That a balancing test is the proper mode of analysis in
dealing with the right to travel is apparent from the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sosna v. Iowa ....
" Id. (citation omitted). For a further discussion of
Sosna, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
116. 476 U.S. 898 (1986). For a further discussion of Soto-Lopez, see supra
notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
117. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904. For a discussion of Shapiro, see supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
118. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 535 F.2d 1245 (1976) (per
curiam).
119. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 261. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
conclusion regarding other court of appeals' decisions with respect to the right
to intrastate travel, see supra note 57 and accompanying text. Apparently, the
Third Circuit's search for other court of appeals' decisions deciding the intrastate right to travel did not include the Fifth or Sixth Circuits. For a discussion
of how these other circuits have addressed this issue, see infra notes 120-25 and
accompanying text.
120. See Wardwell v. Board of Education, 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976)
("right to intrastate travel has [not] been afforded federal constitutional protection"); Wright v. City ofJackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1975)
(found no fundamental right to intrastate travel).
121. 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
122. Id. at 902, 904. In Wright, plaintiffs, all firemen living outside the city
limits, challenged an ordinance which required all municipal employees to main-
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Wardwell v. Board of Education,' 23 the Sixth Circuit concluded that no
right to intrastate travel was protected by the Constitution. 124 Accord-

ingly, the court upheld under a rational basis test, a school employment
policy which required that all teachers establish residence within the
school district within ninety days of employment.1 25 Although these decisions were all concerning the right of an individual to reside outside of
the particular community where that person was employed, they nonetheless were concerned with an individual's right to travel and to live
where she chooses. Although the Third Circuit was not bound by the
decisions of these other courts of appeals and may have questioned the
applicability of these decisions, the fact that the court overlooked such
opinions for guidance and explicitly proclaimed their belief that no
other similar decisions existed suggests the use of result-oriented jurisprudence and raises questions as to the considerations prevalent in the
minds of the Third Circuit judges.
The final question raised by the Third Circuit's analysis in Lutz was
the adoption of the time, place and manner doctrine from first amendment jurisprudence in analyzing a claim of infringement of a fundamental right under substantive due process.' 2 6 The use of this first
amendment standard resulted in the court applying an intermediate
level ofjudicial scrutiny to the area of substantive due process. 12 7 Such
tain their residence within the city limits. Id. at 901. In denying the right to
intrastate travel, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no "fundamental constitutional 'right to commute' which would cause the compelling-governmental purpose test enunciated in Shapiro to apply." Id. at 902 (citing the Supreme Court
of California in Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974)).
123. 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
124. Id. at 627. The Sixth Circuit stated: "We find no support for plaintiff's theory that the right to intrastate travel has been afforded federal constitutional protection." Id.
In Wardwell, a schoolteacher challenged the constitutionality of a rule
adopted by the board of education of the City of Cincinnati, which required all
teachers in the city's schools, hired after a given date, to establish residency
within the city school district within 90 days of employment. Id. at 626. The
plaintiff had lived outside the school district, but within the State of Ohio. Id.
125. Id. at 628. The Sixth Circuit stated,. "where, as in the present case, a
continuing employee residency requirement affecting at most the right of intrastate travel is involved, the 'rational basis' test is the touchstone to determine its
validity." Id.
126. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269-70. For a discussion of the adoption of the time,
place and manner standard of review by the Third Circuit, see supra notes 91-98
and accompanying text.
127. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The Third Circuit stated: "The [time, place and
manner] doctrine allows intermediate scrutiny-not strict--of certain time, place
and manner restrictions on speech." Id. (emphasis added). In analogizing restrictions in the area of free speech to the intrastate right to travel, the Third Circuit
stated: "U]ust as the right to speak cannot conceivably imply the right to speak
whenever, wherever and however one pleases.., so too the right to travel cannot conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever and however one
pleases .... " Id.
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an approach is contrary to the prior decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which has consistently applied a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny when a governmental action infringes upon a fundamental right. 128 This manipulation of a first amendment method ofjudicial
analysis into the area of substantive due process under the fourteenth
amendment is inappropriate and in conflict with the Supreme Court's
substantive due process decisions. 12 9 The area of free speech has engendered its own method of analysis which has not been applied to any
unenumerated fundamental right.13 0 Therefore, the Third Circuit's use
of this method of analysis is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's
use of that test solely in the area of free speech.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
question of whether a right to intrastate travel is protected by the Constitution, the decision of the Third Circuit in Lutz will stand as the principal case on this issue. The Third Circuit's decision in Lutz recognizes a
constitutional basis for a fundamental right to intrastate travel. Yet, according to Lutz, in order for a state to infringe upon such an unenumerated fundamental right, the state need only show that the statute in
question constitutes a reasonable time, place or manner restriction upon
the individual's fundamental right of intrastate travel.
Because the Third Circuit has failed to articulate a persuasive distinction between those "fundamental rights" which require heightened
128. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (employing
strict scrutiny in analyzing substantive due process claims involving fundamental
right to marry); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (struck
down statute, applying strict scrutiny, that allowed only pharmacist to distribute
contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(where burden is placed on fundamental right of extended family to live together, governmental action must be "examined carefully"); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to statute which impaired women's decision to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating restrictions on distribution of contraception under a strict scrutiny
test as invasion of fundamental right to decide matters of procreation); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation statute under strict
scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (White, J., concurring)
(use of contraceptives is fundamental right and regulation restricting use must
be analyzed under strict scrutiny test). The Third Circuit in Lutz, though specifically recognizing that the Supreme Court has routinely applied strict scrutiny in
the area of substantive due process, disregarded these cases. Lutz, 899 F.2d at
255.
129. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269. The Third Circuit appears to have concluded
that, because Lutz represents the first time that a court has clearly held that an
unenumerated right to intrastate travel exists, it could apply a standard of review
of its own choosing.
130. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980) ("essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition that
various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate
governmental goals") (emphasis added).
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scrutiny when infringed, and those, such as the right to intrastate travel,
which require only an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, the court's
unorthodox adoption of an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny for a
newly recognized substantive due process right may have serious implications in other areas of substantive due process. If the Third Circuit
can successfully apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to the fundamental right of intrastate travel under the fourteenth amendment, it remains
to be seen whether it may also apply a similar standard to other
unenumerated rights which have not yet been considered by the
Supreme Court. Given the rather incoherent logic in its rationale, it is
doubtful that many other circuits, much less the United States Supreme
Court, will fully adopt the rationale of the Third Circuit in Lutz.
Keith E. Smith
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